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BROWN v. STATE
proceedings, but the doctrine of O'Neill & Co., Inc. v.
Schulze requires the passage of two terms (as much as
eight months) before judgment becomes final, instead of
sixty days, which was the practice from 1886 to July, 1939.
A consistent following of this decision will result in many
classes of suits being read out of the Act so that the enter-
ing of final judgments will be greatly retarded. The out-
come is that the four month term rule is, at least partly
brought back to life, although this would appear to be
opposed to the intention of the General Assembly of 1886,
as well as to the practice which has prevailed for many
years. Some further action, legislative or judicial, to cor-
rect the result of the principal case would seem to be desir-
able.
CONSTITUTIONALITY OF STATUTE IMPOSING
BURDENSOME TAX ON PARTICULAR KINDS
OF BUSINESS-CLASSIFICATION FOR
PURPOSES OF TAXATION
Brown v. State1
Appellant was indicted and convicted for selling ice
cream from a truck without having obtained the license
required by statute.2 On appeal he alleged that the license
fee exacted by the statute was unconstitutional, in that:
(1) The license law was, in effect, a police regulation and
the fees exacted were so large so as to be destructive of
business; (2) The act worked an arbitrary and unreason-
able classification, which improperly discriminated against
those affected by it; and (3) The section requiring those
buying locally for sale outside the state to obtain a license
was an unconstitutional attempt to regulate buying here
according to the nature of the disposal of the goods outside
the state.
The Court of Appeals affirmed the lower court and up-
held the constitutionality of the statute in its application
19 A. (2d) 209 (Md. 1939).
2 Md. Code Supp. (1935) Art. 56, Sec. 26-30, providing that hawkers
and peddlers must obtain a license to "buy for sale out of the State, or
buy to trade, barter or sell, or offer to trade, barter or sell within the
State any goods, wares or merchandise . . . (there is an exemption as
to) hawkers and peddlers of oysters and fish In their unpreserved and
natural condition, or of fruits and vegetables perishable in their nature
that are sold in their natural conditions In this State". The amount of
the fees exacted varies; for peddlers using motor vehicles, like the ap-
pellant in the instant case, the fee is $300.00.
1940)
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to the appellant. The Court stated that the act was a
revenue measure8 and not an exercise of the police power,
and that any "collateral purposes or motives of a Legis-
lature in levying a tax of a kind within the reach of its
lawful power are matters beyond the scope of judicial in-
quiry." A revenue measure, the Court went on to say,
is not open to judicial inquiry merely because it would
destroy the activity taxed. It is only when a license fee
is exacted as a police regulation that the Court may con-
sider whether it is so unreasonable as to amount to a pro-
hibition.
As to the claim of unreasonable classification, the Court
stated that the exemptions as to peddlers of perishable
foods had existed for a long time (since 1856) without
ever having been questioned." This alone was held to be
a strong argument in support of its recognized and estab-
lished reasonableness; and, in any event, it was said that
the legislature had the power to grant exemptions from
taxation, according to the views of public policy.5 It was
said, however:
"Of course, if such discrimination were purely arbi-
trary, oppressive or capricious and made to depend
on differences of color, race, nativity, religious opin-
ions, political affiliations, or other considerations hav-
ing no possible connection with the duties of citizens
as taxpayers, such exemptions would be pure favor-
itism and a denial of the equal protection of the laws
to the less favored classes."
The Court observed that, whenever possible, classifica-
tions for purposes of taxation made by the legislature are
8 Citing Banks v. McCosker, 82 Md. 518, 34 A. 539, 51 Am. St. Rep. 478
(1896). In this case the Court held that the object of the same statute
was to raise revenue as distinguished from a police regulation to protect
the public. The Court stated that, in seeking the legislative intent as
to whether a statute is a revenue measure or a police regulation, it is
material to inquire into whether the penalty for its violation is a re-
curring one or not. If so, then the legislature probably intended it as a
police regulation. See also Crout v. State, 157 Md. 387, 146 A. 241 (1929) ;
and State v. Amick, 171 Md. 536, 545, 189 A. 817 (1937), for other cases
arising out of the same statute.
'According to appellee's brief, it was questioned on this point in the
lower court in State v. Amick, supra n. 3, but this point was abandoned
on appeal.
5 The Court apparently had Article 15 of the Maryland Declaration of
Rights in mind. The clause Is restricted to taxes that are not property
taxes. See State v. Shapiro, 131 Md. 168, 101 A. 703, An. Cas. 1918E 196
(1917) holding that occupational taxes and licenses are to be levied un-
der the political view clause and are not affected by the uniformity pro-
visions.
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sustained; and, recognizing that taxation presents a prac-
tical problem which makes exact equality impossible to
attain, stated that one who has assailed the classification
has the burden of proving its unreasonableness.
The Court disposed of the question of the constitution-
ality of the section requiring those buying for sale outside
the state to obtain a license by stating that, even if it were
assumed to be invalid, this did not prevent the enforce-
ment of the law against the appellant, who did not him-
self buy, and who sold within the state. As the appellant's
rights were not affected by the provision, even though it
were invalid, he had no standing to question its consti-
tutionality.
On the question as to whether or not the excise tax
is a violation of due process of law because of its destruc-
tive effect, the decision is in accord with the holdings of
the United States Supreme Court. In McCray v. United
States6 the Supreme Court, in upholding the validity of
the Federal tax involved, stated that the act on its face
was a revenue measure and, even though it in effect regu-
lated the oleomargarine industry, the Court must assume
its primary purpose to be to raise revenue. Being a reve-
nue measure, the Court reasoned, the act was a valid ex-
cise tax. This validity was not affected by the fact that
its enforcement would practically destroy or restrict the
manufacture of the product taxed. Thirty years later, in
Magnano Co. v. Hamilton, the same approach was used
with respect to a State tax. The Court stated that the
due process clause would be violated only if the tax were
so unreasonable as to compel the conclusion that the act
did not involve the exertion of the taxing power, but was
in substance and effect a confiscation of property.' The
'195 U. S. 27, 24 S. Ct. 769, 49 L. Ed. 78, 1 An. Cas. 561 (1904). Here
the Court upheld a Federal tax of ten cents a pound on oleomargarine
artificially colored, against the contention that this was confiscatory and
intended so to be.
7292 U. S. 40, 54 S. Ct. 599, 78 L. Ed. 1109 (1934). Here the Court
upheld a state tax of 150 a pound on butter substitutes, again alleged
to be confiscatory in purpose and effect; the product involved was assumed
by the Court to be not only harmless, but of definite dietary value.
' The Court cited and, quoted, among other cases, Alaska Fish Co. v.
Smith, 255 U. S. 44, 48, 41 S. Ct. 219, 65 L. Ed. 489 (1921), upholding a
statute of Alaska levying a heavy license tax upon persons manufac-
turing fish oil against the contention that it would prohibit and confis-
cate plaintiff's business, where it was said "Even if the tax should de-
stroy a business it would not be made invalid or require compensation
upon that ground alone. Those who enter upon a business take that
risk.. . . The Acts must be judged by their contents not by the alle-
gations as to their purpose in the complaint."
1940)
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Supreme Court has followed this reasoning, with but lit-
tle variation, in numerous other cases,9 and has recently
said in Great Atlantic and Pacific Tea Co. v. Grosjean:10
"Much broader considerations touching the state's
internal policy of police sustain the exaction. The
tax is laid solely upon intrastate commerce. In the
exercise of its police power the state may forbid, as
inimical to the public welfare, the prosecution of a
particular type of business, or regulate a business in
such a manner as to abate evils deemed to arise from
its pursuit. Whatever a state may forbid or regu-
late it may permit upon the condition that a fee be
paid in return for the privilege, and such a fee may
be exacted to discourage the prosecution of a busi-
ness or to adjust competitive or economic inequal-
ities.""1
The Supreme Court cases, in effect then, allow legis-
lative bodies to impose confiscatory or prohibitive taxes
destroying or suppressing the particular activity or prod-
uct taxed, as long as the tax is on its face one for reve-
nue. In determining whether a tax is for revenue or is
an exercise of the police power, the Court has refused
to search for hidden motives or to find them in the mere
fact of a burdensome or even confiscatory effect. Some
authorities12 see in this reasoning a misconception of Mr.
Chief Justice Marshall's dictum in McCulloch v. Mary-
land 8 that "the power to tax involves the power to de-
stroy". This was made in holding a tax to be invalid.
It has been suggested that its true application is only where
there exists no power at all to tax a particular subject,
and not in a case where that power actually -exists but
(as here) its constitutionality is assailed because it is
alleged to be so excessive as to violate due process of law.
In some cases in which the Supreme Court has sus-
tained tax laws alleged to be destructive, we find that it
was within the power of the legislature, so far as due
process of law was concerned, to accomplish the same re-
I See generally, Brown, The Eacise Tam As a Regulatory Device (1938)
23 Corn. L. Q. 45; Sholley, Equal Protection in Tam Legislation (1938)
24 Va. L. Rev. 229, 388.
10 301 U. S. 412, 57 S. Ct. 772, 81 L. Ed. 1193, 1201 (1937).
11 Ibid. Italics supplied.
12 1 CooLEY, TAxAnoN (4th Ed. 1924) Sec. 72; Brown, 8upra n. 9.
"14 Wheat. 316, 431, 4 L. Ed. 579, 607 (1819).
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sult by direct prohibition or regulation. 14  In others, how-
ever, this has not been true and the use of the taxing power
for regulatory or prohibitive purposes has been upheld in
the absence of a showing of such purposes on the face
of the statute, even though legislation directly seeking
such results would have been unconstitutional. 5
Many of the state courts on the other hand, have dis-
tinguished between the two situations and have looked
with disfavor upon tax laws falling in the second group
mentioned. 6 Where the occupation or thing oppressively
taxed is something that the state may under its police
powers suppress, the tax has been of course sustained.17
On the other hand, if the activity or thing oppressively
taxed is of an innocent character, many of the state courts
hold the tax to be void under the due process clause.'8
In Maryland, the Court of Appeals has repeatedly made
a distinction as to whether the tax is levied as a revenue
14 E. g., Veazie Bank v. Fenno, 8 Wall. 533, 19 L. Ed. 482 (1869) ; Son-
zinky v. United States, 300 U. S. 506, 57 S. Ct. 554, 81 L. Ed. 772 (1937).
Il E. g., McCray v. United States, supra n. 6; Magnano v. Hamilton,
8pra n. 7.
16 See Chaddock v. Day, 75 Mich. 527, 42 N. W. 977 (1889) where the
Court held an ordinance regulating and taxing peddlers of fresh meat to
be invalid; and State v. Osborne, 171 Iowa 678, 154 N. W. 294 (1915)
where the Court held invalid an annual state license tax of $200 on
transient merchants in each county in which they did business. The
Court said: "The first section of our Bill of Rights assures to every man
protection in his natural right to acquire, possess, and, enjoy property.
This necessarily includes the right to buy, sell, and exchange, and in so
far as the traffic is of a harmless and useful character the state may
not impose an occupation tax which shall operate as a prohibition or as
a burden of magnitude sufficient to render the right valueless." See also:
Fiscal Court v. F. & A. Cox Co., 132 Ky. 738, 117 S. W. 296, 21 L. R. A.
(N. S.) 83 (1909); Morton v. City of Macon, 111 Ga. 162, 36 S. E. 627,
50 L. R. A. 485 (1900) ; People v. Wilson, 249 Ill. 195, 94 N. E. 141 (1911) ;
Cache County v. Jensen, 21 Utah 207, 61 Pac. 303 (1900); Hushfield v.
City of Dallas, 29 Texas A. Rep. 242, 15 S. W. 124; Ex parte Burnett, 30
Ala. 461 (1857); Caldwell v. City of Lincoln, 19 Neb. 569, 27 N. W. 647
(1886) ; Pacific Rys. Adv. Co. v. Conrad, 168 Cal. 91, 141 Pac. 916 (1914).
17 See Hale v. State, 217 Ala. 403, 116 So. 369 (1928); Indianapolis v.
Bieler, 138 Ind. 30, 36 N. E. 857 (1894); Commonwealth v. McCray, 250
Ky. 182, 61 S. W. (2d) 1043 (1933); State v. Wilson, 101 Kan. 789, 168
Pac. 679 (1917); Stalick v. Gallup, 23 N. M. 405, 168 Pac. 707 (1917).
1s See State v. Kartus, 230 Ala. 352, 162 So. 533 (1935) ; In re Dees, 50
Cal. App. 11, 194 Pac. 717 (1920); Miami Transit Co. v. McLin, 101 Fla.
1233, 133 So. 99 (1931) ; Shellnut v. City Council, 163 Ga. 502, 136 S. E.
446 (1927) ; People v. Wilson, 249 Ill. 195, 94 N. E. 141 (1911) ; State v.
Osborne, 171 Iowa 678, 154 N. W. 294 (1915); Fiscal Court v. F. & A.
Cox Co., 132 Ky. 738, 117 S. W. 296 (1909) ; City of Louisville v. Pooley, 136
Ky. 286, 124 S. W. 315 (1910); In re Opinion of Justices, 123 Me. 573,
121 A. 902 (1923); Peterson Baking Co. v. Freemont, 119 Neb. 212, 228
N. W. 256 (1929); Grantham v. Chickaska, 156 Oklza 56, 9 P. (2d) 747
(1932).
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measure or merely as a police regulation.19 The Court is
in accord with some other state courts20 in holding that
the amount of a license or occupation tax, as distinguished
from a fee imposed in the exercise of the police power, is
within the discretion of the legislature and cannot be re-
viewed by the courts. Its approach seems to have been
substantially that of the Supreme Court heretofore dis-
cussed. Though the refusal to go behind statutes may
be in theory criticized,2 yet it is submitted that sound
considerations of policy support it. The obvious difficulties
attendant upon any judicial inquiry into undisclosed leg-
islative motives and questions as to proper and improper
measures of taxation give ample reason for the rule as
stated.
On the question of discrimination in taxation, the Su-
preme Court, since the case of Bells Gap Railroad Co. v.
Pennsylvania,22 has taken the position that the equal pro-
tection clause of the fourteenth amendment is a limitation
upon the taxing power of the states, and has stated as the
guiding principle that a proper classification "must always
rest upon some difference which bears a reasonable and
just relation to the act in respect to which the classification
is proposed, and can never be made arbitrarily and with-
out any such basis".2  While this test is obviously so vague
and general as to be difficult of application and compara-
tively meaningless, the Court has been extremely cau-
tious in holding a classification for revenue purposes to
be invalid.24
When we consider the Supreme Court cases, it is dif-
ficult to find any arbitrary or unreasonable classification
10 Banks v. McCosker, 82 Md. 518, 34 A. 539, 51 Am. St. Rep. 478 (1896);
State v. Shapiro, 131 Md. 168, 101 A. 703, Ann. Cas. 1918E 196 (1917);
Jones v. Gordy, 169 Md. 173, 180 A. 272 (1935); State v. Applegarth, 81
Md. 293, 300, 31 A. 961, 28 L. R. A. 812 (1895); Meushaw v. State, 109
Md. 84, 91 A. 457 (1908).
20 Stull v. De Mottos, 23 Wash. 71, 62 Pac. 451 (1900); McKnight v.
Hodge, 55 Wash. 289, 104 Pac. 504 (1909) ; Bradley & Co. v. City of Rich-
mond, 110 Va. 521, 66 S. E. 872 (1910); Woodall v. City of Lynchburg,
100 Va. 318, 40 S. E. 915 (1902) ; State v. Roberson, 136 N. C. 587, 48 S. E.
595 (1904) State v. Hunt, 129 N. C. 686, 40 S. E. 216, 85 Am. St. Rep.
758 (1901) ; Pryor v. State, 130 So. 855 (Miss. 1932).
21 See Brown, s.*pra n. 9.
22134 U. S. 232, 10 S. Ct. 533, 33 L. Ed. 892 (1890).
22 Gulf, C. & S. F. By. Co. v. Ellis, 165 U. S. 150, 155, 17 S. Ct. 255 41
L. Ed. 666 (1897).
21 Sholley, supra n. 9, points out that, aside from the cases dealing
with special taxes on corporations, the Supreme Court has held only
eight statutory classifications in revenue legislation to be invalid because
of a violation of the equal protection clause; all of these cases have
been since 1921 and half of them since 1933.
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in the statute in question, in the instant case. Here the
tax places the same burden on all of those dealing in the
sale of ice cream and other commodities, in the same way,
and the exemptions allowed by the statute are on entirely
different products. Here we are not concerned with a classi-
fication between competitive articles of a similar physical
character, and thus are not confronted with the argument
that the taxpayer must pay a heavier tax burden than
his competitor, who is exempted. Even in cases of this
nature the Supreme Court has upheld the classification.25
As against the contention that the act discriminates against
sellers of ice cream from motor vehicles in favor of those
selling in stores, the Court has also upheld classifications
based on different methods of conducting the same busi-
ness or occupation, even though the persons taxed are in
competition and unable to pass the tax on to the con-
sumer.26  The cases involving the discriminatory taxation
of chain stores show clearly the difficulty in drawing the
line between reasonable and arbitrary classifications based
on methods of doing business, and the tendency to seize
upon even small differences to justify a legislative differ-
ence in treatment.27 In the recent case of Madden v. Com-
monwealth of Kentucky, s the Supreme Court, in uphold-
ing the tax said: 21
"... Classification has been a device for fitting
tax programs to local needs and usages in order to
achieve an equitable distribution of the tax burdens
•... [thus,] in taxation, even more than in other fields,
legislatures possess the greatest freedom in classifi-
cation."
'5 Heisler v. Thomas Colliery Co., 260 U. S. 245, 43 S. Ct. 83, 67 L. Ed.
237 (1922) ; Magnano Co. v. Hamilton, 292 U. S. 40, 54 S. Ct. 599, 78 L.
Ed. 1109 (1934).
26 American Sugar Refining Co. v. Louisiana, 179 U. S. 89, 21 S. Ct.
43, 45 L. Ed. 102 (1900) ; Quong Wing v. Kirkendall, 223 U. S. 59,32 S. Ct. 192,
56 L,. Ed. 350 (1912) ; Singer Sewing Machine Co. v. Brickell, 233 U. S.
304, 34 S. Ct. 493, 58 L. Ed. 974 (1914); Armour & Co. v. Va., 246 U. S.
1, 38 S. Ct. 267, 62 L. Ed. 547 (1918).
27 State Board of Tax Comimissioners v. Jackson, 283 U. S. 527, 51 S.
Ct. 540, 75 L. Ed. 1248 (1931); Louis K. Liggett Co. v. Lee, 288 U. S.
517, 53 S. Ct. 481, 77 L. Ed. 929 (1933) ; Fox v. Standard Oil Co., 294
U. S. 87, 55 S. Ct. 333, 79 L. Ed. 780 (1935); Great A. & P. Tea Co. v.
Grosjean, 301 U. S. 412, 57 S. Ct. 772, 81 L. Ed. 1193 (1937).
21160 Sup. Ct. 406 (U. S. 1940). Here a Kentucky statute placing an
ad valorem tax on deposits in Kentucky banks at the rate of 100 per
$100.00 as compared with 504 per $100.00 on depositp in banks outside
the state was held to be valid.
29 60 S. Ct. 406, 408 (U. S. 1940).
1940]
326 MARYLAND LAW REVIEW [VOL. IV
The Court went on to state that, as the legislature was
familiar with local conditions, there exists a presumption
of validity, and the burden is on the one who attacks a
classification to negative any conceivable basis which might
support it.
The holding of the Court of Appeals in this case as to
classification is supported amply by the Supreme Court
cases and also by the decisions of other State Courts.80
30 See Ex parte Case, 70 Ore. 291, 135 Pac. 881 (1913), 141 Pac. 746,
An. Cas. 1916B 490 (1914), where the license on peddlers exempted those
peddling nursery and farm products was held to be a reasonable classi-
fication. People v. Smith, 147 Mich. 391, 110 N. W. 1102 (1907), where
a license tax on peddlers, except those selling vegetables, fish, meat or
farm produce, and bakers delivering bread and pastry to customers was
held to be valid. Also see McKnight v. Hodge, 55 Wash. 289, 104 Pac.
504 (1909), where an almost identical statute was upheld, and Ruggles
v. State, 120 Md.. 553, 87 A. 1080 (1913).
